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INTRODUCTION

Life can seem unfair to law professors whose scholarship focuses on
corporate law. We just do not get the same amount of attention as our
colleagues who write about constitutional law or other such subjects
whose social significance is more readily recognized by those outside of
1
the field. It is therefore only natural to respond by seeking ways in
which our subject does indeed have great significance for society as a
whole. For many corporate law scholars, this means arguing that
corporate governance rules are a critical determinant of economic
2
growth.
For other scholars, who are concerned about wealth
distribution, the environment, or the like, this means arguing that
corporate governance rules can be the tools to achieve so-called
corporate social responsibility.3 In either case, it takes no behavioral
experiments to recognize the danger that corporate law scholars might
attribute an unrealistic degree of significance to corporate law rules.
With the goal of adding a reality check, I have chosen to respond to
Professor Kent Greenfield's paper, "Using Behavioral Economics to
4
Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool."
In his paper, Professor Greenfield proposes three changes in American
corporate governance rules: (1) relaxation of the norm that the goal of
corporate management should be to maximize profits for the
shareholders of the corporation (often referred to as either the
shareholder primacy or profit maximization norm); (2) broadening the
fiduciary duty of corporate directors and management to include an
obligation to the corporation's employees; and (3) mandating inclusion
of employee representatives on corporate boards. While none of these

' It could be worse. We could be writing about tax laws. See, e.g., William J. Turnier,
Tax (tmd Lots of Other) Scholars Need Not Apply: The Clwuging Venue for Sclzolarsllip, 50 J.
L EGA L ED. 189 (2000).

' See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Does Lnw Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East
Asia, 34 L. & Soc'y REV. 829 (2000}.
' See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioml Ecouomics to Show the Power aud Efficieucy
of Corporate li!il' as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); Cynthia A. Williams,
Corporate Social RespoHsibility i111111 Em of Economic Globnlizatio~r, 35 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 705
(2002). These articles illustrate a certain irony in thE' so-called progressive approach to
corporate law. At one point, scholarship, which many characterized as progressive,
focused on protecting shc~reholders from corporate managers. See, e.g., William Cc~ry,
Federalism and Corpomte Law: Ret1e<"timzs Uporz Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1')74). Now, we
find so-called progressive corporate law scholars seeking to give managers more discretion
to consider the interests of other s takeholders at the possible expense of the shareholders.
The irony is that this has occurred at a time when a greater percentage of ordinary
Americans own stock.
' Greenfield, supra note 3.
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proposals is new, Professor Greenfield argues that behavioral science
shows how these three changes can lead to an increase in employee
wages and a decrease in income inequality in the United States. At the
same time, Professor Greenfield strives mightily to argue upon the same
basis that increased wages need not mean decreased corporate efficiency
(insofar as increased income for workers will more than offset any
decreased profit for the shareholders). Needless to say, there is room to
question whether Professor Greenfield understates the extent of the
tradeoff between regulatory policies directed toward increasing wages
and the goal of economic efficiency. This, in turn, can lead back into the
endless debate about the appropriate balance in our society between the
goals of wealth maximization and wealth distribution. These issues,
however, I leave to others. Instead, I am enough of an old-fashioned
liberal (and a one-time dues paying union member) to buy into, at least
for purposes of this reply, Professor Greenfield's normative value
judgment as to the desirability of using legal intervention to raise
workers' wages. My concern is whether corporate law provides a
realistic means toward achieving this end.
In this reply, I will look at the three suggestions Professor Greenfield
proposes. Part I of this reply will consider the impact of relaxing the
corporate law norm that the purpose of a business corporation, and the
goal of the company's management, should be to maximize profits for
the shareholders. Part II will examine the impact of expanding the
fiduciary duty of a corporation's directors and management to include
an obligation toward the corporation's employees. Part III will address
the impact of mandating employee representation on corporate boards.
Finally, Part IV will suggest that reform of employment contract law
might provide a more effective vehicle to achieve the ends Professor
Greenfield espouses.
I. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM IN
CORPORATE LAW

A. The Legal Reality of the Shareholder Primacy Norm

Professor Greenfield's paper is the latest, but no doubt not the last,
volley in a long-standing academic debate regarding for whose benefit
corporate directors should act.' In many, if not most states, legislatures

REV.

' Ser, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Wham Carpomte Managers arc Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
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some years ago seem to have resolved this debate in the direction
Professor Greenfield favors. These legislatures amended corporation
statutes to empower directors to consider the interests of various
constituencies, including the employees, in making the board's
decisions.b In other jurisdictions, however, including Delaware, judicial
authority continues to govern the issue. Professor Greenfield, not
7
surprisingly, cites the classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. as the
fountainhead of the corporate law rule that the ultimate objective of the
directors of a business corporation must be to make profits for the
shareholders. Actually, it is worth taking a closer look at the Dodge
opinion, because it illustrates that this shareholder primacy norm in
American corporate law has been more a matter of rhetoric than an
enforceable legal obligation.
The Dodge brothers were minority shareholders in Ford Motor Co.
Henry Ford owned a majority of the o utstanding stock and apparently
dominated the board. Ford Motor Co. at this time was unbelievably
successful. The corporation had huge cash reserves and was making
money hand over fist. The board was declaring a generous regular
dividend and also had been declaring special dividends. The Dodge
brothers sued after Henry Ford announced that the corporation would
not pay any more special dividends, but, instead, would retain the extra
earnings for expansion. Dodge is one of the rare cases in which a court
found directors abused their discretion in refusing to declare dividends
- largely based upon the fact that the corporation was making money
faster than the directors could spend it on expansion, even if the board
declared more dividends.
What is important about the case for present purposes is a side
discussion the court undertook regarding the corporation's expansion
plans. Statements by Henry Ford, both in and out of court, suggest that
his reason for expanding the business was not to maximize profits, but
rather, stemmed from his desire to implement his economic and social
views. Specifically, Henry Ford expressed the view that the company
sho uld lower the price of its cars and expand its production, not to
increase profits; but to enable more Americans to own a car and to
provide employment for more persons.R The court took a different view
L. REV. 1365 {1932}.
" See, e.g., American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, Other

Constiturncir> Stntutt>S: Potmtin/ for Gmfusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1\190) (describing various
statutes).
170 N.W. 668 (1919).
' Cynics might wonder whether Henry Ford actually cut th<' dividend because the
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of the permissible goals of a business corporation. Such a corporation (as
opposed to a corporation organized as a non-profit corporation) exists,
the court explained, "primarily for the profit of the shareholders." The
directors have great discretion in choosing the means toward that end,
but the directors breach their duty if they act to change the end objective
itself from profiting the shareholders to seeking to benefit others.
Professor Greenfield quotes this part of the court's opinion as
establishing the shareholder primacy or profit maximizing norm.
Yet, as significant as the Dodge opinion's statements about shareholder
primacy would seem, these statements generally have figured far more
prominently in academic debates than they have in the practical
workings of corporate law. The reason is found in the court's actual
holding. The court ordered the payment of a special dividend; but this
was only because Ford Motor Co. had plenty of money both to expand
and to pay the dividend. Critically, however, the court refused to block
Ford's expansion plans, despite what the court had to say concerning
Henry Ford's express motivations for those plans. The court felt that the
expansion plans might serve a business purpose and refused to
substitute the court's judgment for the business expertise of the directors.
9
The court's opinion in another classic case, Shlcnsky v. Wrigley, is
similar. A minority shareholder in the corporation which operated the
Chicago Cubs baseball team sued to compel the directors to instaJllights
at Wrigley Field. The plaintiff alleged that the inability to play night
baseball games at Wrigley Field lowered attendance and resulted in the
corporation losing money. The plaintiff further alleged that the directors
refused to install lights because the majority shareholder, Philip Wrigley,
believed baseball is a daytime sport, and he was concerned about the
possibly detrimental effect of night games on the surrounding
neighborhood. The court dismissed the complaint as not stating a cause
of action. In response to the plaintiff's allegations concerning Wrigley's
motives, the court speculated that it might be in the corporation's best
interest to look out for the neighborhood, because the company owned
real estate there (the ballpark) and because patrons might not wish to
attend games in a poor neighborhood.

Dodge brothers were using the money to start their own car company. Biographers of
Henry Ford suggest, however, his statements were sincere. E.g., Allan NEVINS, FORD:
THE TrMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY 575 (1954}. At this point in his life (before he got
into fights with his employees}, Henry Ford evidently had developed a certain grand view
of his mission in life as the person to bring industrial prosperity to America.
' 237N.E.2d 776 (IlL App. Ct.1968).
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The practical upshot of cases like Dodge and Wrigley is that, by and
large, courts have not scrutinized business decisions to see whether
directors sacrificed profit maximization to advance the interests of
employees, creditors, customers, and the community. Instead, the courts
almost invariably accept some rationale as to how the business decisions
were in the long-range interest of the shareholders. 10 indeed, even in
those few cases in which outspoken individuals (like Henry Ford or
Philip Wrigley) might ignore legal advice and express "profit be
damned" sentiments, courts seem willing to conjure up profit
maximizing rationalizations for the directors' actions.
interestingly enough, much of Professor Greenfield's paper reinforces
the conclusion that the corporate law shareholder primacy norm is not a
barrier to corporate boards increasing wages. Professor Greenfield goes
to great lengths to show how increasing wages of lower level workers
might potentially increase profits. Specifically, increasing wages for
production workers might increase loyalty and productivity and thereby
decrease the need to employ more middle managers to monitor lower
11
level workers. Indeed, Dodge suggests that courts, even without the
behavioral studies cited by Professor Greenfield, will be quite accepting
of the argument that being good to workers and increasing wages is in
the long-range best interest of corporate profitability. In fact, courts have
been very deferential to the corporation's directors in reviewing
challenged employee compensation decisions - at least if the directors
approving the compensation are not all in a conflict of interest as
12
recipients themselves.
Hence, even if Professor Greenfield is
completely wrong in his argument that corporations can increase wages
and decrease other monitoring costs, this rationale is more than plausible
enough to allow directors to raise wages without fear of liability.

'" See. e.g., Paramount Communications, lnc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(maintaining "Time culture" of journalistic integrity, in part, justified rejection of higher
price bid for control of Time Inc.).
" The notion that higher wages and other steps to increase worker morale often might
more than pay for themo;elves through increased productivity is hardly revolutionary.
Indeed, Professor Greenfield is fairly conservative in his claim insofar as he only suggests
that the increased income to production workers will be greater than the decreased profit
to the shareholders. Yet, this is obviously not an exact science. Hence, there is certainly a
substantial s pectrum in which directors can argue plausibly that increasing wages would
actually increase overall corporate profits-and who is to say they would be wrong?
" See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960). Indeed, perhaps greater judicial
scrutiny of compensation for senior corporate executives might do something to trim the
gap between senior executive compensation and worker wages, about which Professor
Greenfield complains.
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B. Other Forces Producing Shareholder Primacy
Recognizing that cases like Dodge and Wrigletj have made something of
a marshmallow out of the shareholder primacy norm, at least as an
enforceable rule of corporate law, Professor Greenfield argues that the
judicial utterance of this norm still can have a psychological impact on
the actions of corporate boards. Yet, there obviously is room to question
whether the simple experiments Professor Greenfield discusses provide
an accurate insight into the more complex forces at work in the corporate
13
milieu. Indeed, once we open the door to the prospect that corporate
boards may act consistently with a shareholder primacy norm despite
the lack of any realistic enforcement, we must note that all sorts of nonlegal forces could cause boards and managers to continue to act
consistently with this norm even if courts or legislatures were to relax
the formal rhetoric. The most obvious force at work is simply
competitive market pressure. After all, a corporation which fails to keep
costs (including labor costs) down can find itself losing market share to
14
competing firms able to sell at lower prices. Also, failure to maximize
profits for shareholders might place the corporation at a disadvantage in
15
raising needed capital.
Moreover, failure to maximize shareholder
profits places management in danger of being displaced through a
16
hostile takeover. There can be psychological forces at work as well. For
" For example, one arguable flaw in these experiments is that evidently none of the
participants actually had contributed anything of their own to the pot. Even when they
were playing with real money, they were dividing up "found money;" i.e., no matter what
they did, they were not going to be out any significant labor done or money they had
earned before becoming involved with the experiment. Under these circumstances, it
might be much easier to take a relaxed attitude toward driving a hard bilrgain and to
change one's attitude when told of an obligation to a third party. (Of course, one might
object that the concept of "found money" is n ot economically rational; but the whole point
of these experiments is that people are not rational economic actors.) Moreover, one might
well expect different results in a situation in which the relative size of each participant's
reward assumes psychological importance as a measure of self-worth. The negotiation of
professional athletes' contracts illustrates this phenomenon. In the case of those who
contribute capital, obtaining a higher return on their investment often seems to be viewed
as establishing self-worth by showing how smart the investor is.
" See, 1'.8., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Stale Lnw, Shareholder Protection. nnd the Theory of the
CorporaliOII, 6 ). LEGAL STUD. 251, 264 (1977).
•; ld. at 257.
"' E.g., Henry G. Manne, 011r Two Corpornfion Systems: Lnw nnd Eco11omics, 53 VA. L.
REV. 259 (1967). Interestingly, the corporate takeover context is one in which the question

of whether directors can sacrifice maximum gain for the shareholders in order to look out
for the interests of other constituencies can have real bite. To illustrate why, suppose that
the board of a corporation receives an offer to buy out all of the existing shareholders for
cash. Further, suppose that this offer comes from a party who plans to engage in a
leveraged buy-out which will decrease the credit worthiness, and hence the market value,
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example, the profit maximization norm might be more of a reflection of
17
American business ethos than a reaction to judicial pronouncements. In
addition, not to sound completely cynical, but creating a work
environment which requires more monitoring is in the interest of those
who aspire to become managers rather than just workers.
The ultimate question thus becomes how significant is a virtually
unenforced corporate law shareholder primacy norm, versus these other
forces which can cause directors and managers to act in a way to
maximize corporate profits at the possible expense of employee wages
and working conditions. There are several ways one might attempt to
tease out an empirical answer to this question. To begin with, because
the shareholder primacy norm only applies to investor owned
corporations, one might compare wages and working conditions in
investor owned and non-profit corporations in the same industries. For
example, how do wages and working conditions compare at Federal

of the corporation's bonds, thereby harming the company's existing creditors. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Also,
suppose that this buyer intends to restructure the company by laying off employees. Can
the directors reject the offer because of its impact on creditors and employees? Notice, in
this event, it would seem more difficult to conjure up ways in which protecting these other
constituencies is in the long-run best interest of the existing shareholders, since, under the
proposed deal, the existing shareholders are selling out.
In a couple of opinions, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether directors breach their duty if they seek to prevent a corporate takeover in order to
protect the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders. In Unocnl Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court stated that, in
deciding to oppose a takeover bid, the directors could consider the impact of the bid on
constituencies other than the shareholders. This includes, according to the court, creditors,
customers, employees, and "perhaps even the community generally." ld. at 955. Nine
months later, however, in Revlon, l11c. v. MacA11drews & Forbes Holdiugs , Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986), the same court rejected the directors ' other constituencies rationale for favoring
one takeover bid over another. The board argued that the favored bid protected the
holders of certain promissory notes issued by the corporation better than did the
disfavored bid. In rejecting this rationale, the court qualified the statement in U11ocal about
considering other constituencies. This is permissible, according to the Rev/on opinion, only
to the extent there are rationally related benefits accruing to the shareholders. In a
situation, such as Rev/on, in which the directors have decided to have the shareholders sell
out for cash to one of two bidders in any event, there can be no such long-range
shareholder benefit from considering the interests of other constituencies. Hence, the
Re'vloll situation is one in which the shareholder primacy norm actually can have legal
significance. Still, the Rev/on situation is not that common. Outside of the Rev/on situation,
the Delaware Supreme Court has pretty well deferred to the board's imagination in finding
long-range shareholder benefit from rejecting cash bids in favor of looking out for other
interests. See suprn note 10.
" See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Political Precotrditio11s to Sc'Parating Ownership from Control, 53
STAN. L. REV. 539, 554 (2000) (observing that belief in shareholder profit maximization
norm is widespread in American business circles).
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8

Express versus the United States Post Officei Is there a significant
difference in wages and working conditions between municipally owned
power companies and investor owned power companiesi~ What about
in proprietary versus voluntary hospitals? Yet, even if the presence of
shareholders has correlated with lower wages and poorer working
conditions than found in entities without shareholders, this does not
mean that a sense of fiduciary duty to the shareholders has caused the
difference. For example, one of the pressures for maintaining profits for
shareholders comes from the threat of takeovers.20 Merely relaxing the
21
shareholder primacy norm will not remove this threat.
More
fundamentally, the existence of a takeover threat may tell us something
about American business ethos which goes well beyond legal norms. It
shows that there are persons in the business world who wish to exercise
control over corporations in order to increase profits, including perhaps
by reducing labor costs. In other words, for every business person who
feels that the pressure of reporting to public shareholders is a handicap
2
in treating employees as well as the business person would like} there
are plenty of other business persons with a different attitude toward
their workers. Indeed, it is the closely held firm - where those in
control commonly answer only to themselves as shareholders- which,
as often as not, is the company paying minimum wages.

" Where working conditions have become so stressed that some employees have
"gone postal." For a discussion of labor strife at the United States Post Office, see Rick
Brooks, Blizznrd of GrirLmrces Joins a Sack of Woe~ nt U.S. Postal Sen>
ice, WALL ST. J., June 22,
2001 , at At.
•• Anecdotal evidence in my region indicates that employee compensation at investor
owned Pacific Gas and Electric Company may be somewhat higher than at Sacramento
Municipal Power District.
"' Indeed, Professor G reenfield points to a study indicating that the adoption of state
anti-takeover legislation may have produced higher wages. Greenfield , supra note 3, at 579.
" As noted earlier, only in a fairly limited set of circumstances can directors not
consider the interests of other constituencies, such as employees, in deciding whether to
oppose a takeover. Moreover, the mere fact that directors legally can oppose a tender offer
based upon concern ~ for other constituencies does not mean that, as practical matter,
directors can prevent a particular offer from succeed ing. Hence, state anti-takeover
statutes contain provisions seeking to make hostile takeovers difficult, which go well
beyond allowing directors to consider the interests of other constituencies. Sec, e.g.,
fRANKLIN A GEVUKrZ, CORPORATION LAW§ 7.3.3 (2000) (discussing types of state takeover
legislation).
" As was Professor Greenfield's experience at Levy Strauss & Co.
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ll. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF EXPANDING DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'
FIDUCIARY DUTY ON ACHIEVING CORPORATE SoCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Professor Greenfield goes beyond proposing an easing of the
shareholder primacy norm - thereby allowing directors to consider the
interests of employees without breaching the directors' duty to tlze
shareholders- to propose, in addition, that directors and management
should have a legally enforceable fiduciary duty to the employees. In
suggesting such an expansion of the directors' fiduciary duty to
encompass other stakeholders in the corporation, Professor Greenfield
23
once again joins in a long-standing debate. I shall not add to the length
of this reply by going into the various arguments based on economic
efficiency, or the nature of relational contracts, for or against extending a
fiduciary duty beyond the residual claimants in the corporate enterprise
(i.e. the shareholders). Instead, I wish to raise a concern that has not
been the subject of as much focus in the existing literature and that is
more attuned to the "practical impact of corporate law" theme of my
reply. This concern goes to how, exactly, courts would apply a fiduciary
duty of corporate directors and officers toward the corporation's
employees.
A. A Look at the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law

As stated by Justice Frankfurter in a much-quoted line, to say that a
24
person is a fiduciary only begins the analysis. In the present context, to
urge that directors and "management" have a fiduciary duty toward the
corporation's employees simply opens the door to a host of further
questions. One must ask who can enforce this duty, through what
procedure, with what remedy, against whom, and, perhaps most
importantly, what standard is the court to apply in deciding if the duty
was breached. Let us focus for now on this last question. Professor
Greenfield assumes that the standard the courts will apply in judging
whether directors or management breached their fiduciary duty toward
employees is the fairness test. However, the fairness test would
generally not be the appropriate test to apply under accepted corporate
law doctrine, even if courts were to expand the fiduciary duty of
directors and officers in order to make employees also beneficiaries of
" See, e.g.• Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Slwrcliolders tile Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23
(1991); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121, 156-157
(1991).

" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85 (1943).
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the duty.
Broadly speaking, the fiduciary duty of corporate directors and
officers breaks down into two more specific duties- a duty of care and
2
a duty of loyalty. ·' Courts apply the fairness test when dealing with
claims based upon an alleged breach of the directors' or officers' duty of
loyalty; in other words, when the allegation is that the directors or
officers put their own personal interests ahead of the interests of the
26
corporation or its shareholders. In a situation in which the directors or
officers do not have a conflict with their own personal interests, then, as
a general proposition, the duty involved is one of care. Here, if the claim
is that a director or officer paid no attention to his or her responsibilities,
courts typically analyze the alleged breach of the duty of care by
27
applying principles familiar from the tort of negligence. Courts apply
the so-called business judgment rule to situations in which shareholders
challenge decisions made (as opposed to inattention) by directors when
28
the directors are not in a conflict of interest.
At least as a first approximation, it would appear that claims by
employees against directors, even if directors owed a fiduciary duty to
the employees, would implicate the duty of care rather than of loyalty.
After all, setting salaries for employees other than the directors
themselves, deciding about layoffs, and determining other possible
employment policies, do not involve transactions between the
corporation and the directors or transactions in which the directors have
a material financial interest. Hence, these sorts of decisions, if made by
29
the board, would trigger the business judgment rule.
" E.g., GEVURTZ, supm note 21 at 273.
'" E.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980).
" See, e.g.. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1'!81}.
"' E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
,, See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 ( Del. Ch. 1960). While cases such as Beard
involve complaints by shareholders that the level of compensation set by the board was too
high, presumably the standard should be the same when reviewing complaints by
employees that a disinterested board set their compensation tt)O low.
Of course, most decisions impacting corporate employees - who to hire and fire,
individual compensation levels, specific working conditions- typically are not made by
the board of d irectors but instead are made by officers and middle managers. In this event,
the business judgment rule would not be the applicable standard in dealing with a duty of
care claim against corporate d irectors, since the business judgment rule <~pplies only to
decisions by directors, rather than to claims based upon the directors' inattention. See, e.g..
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). Still, prevailing in a claim based upon
inattention would require the complaining employees to show that a reasonable person in
the director's position would have been aware of whatever action the employees are
complaining about. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 ( Del. 1'!63).
Unless the complained of action was egregious and widespread, such <Jn inattention claim
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The business judgment rule means different things to different
courts.30 To most courts, however, the business judgment rule serves to
insulate the directors from liability for ordinary negligence in making
business decisions. For example, in Delaware, directors are not liable for
a business decision (so long as the decision does not involve a conflict of
interest) unless they made the decision in bad faith or with gross
31
negligence.
Alternatively, other courts have interpreted the rule as
limiting the court's ability to review the substantive reasonableness of
the directors' decision (as opposed to the process by which the board
32
reached the decision). At the extreme, some courts view the business
judgment rule as placing beyond challenge pretty much any decision
made by directors without a conflict of interest, no matter how ill-

likely will founder in a corporation with any substantial size, based upon the argument
that directors can hardly be expected to know what is going on with every corporate
employee. Compare Graham (directors could not be expected to be aware of price fixing by
corporate employees), with Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (director
breached her duty of care to corporation's clients when she should have been aware that
her two sons, who were running the corporation, were stealing company blind). Notice,
incidentally, as a practical matter, conduct sufficiently egregious that the direc tor~ ~hould
have been aware of it often w ill involve illegal actions (such as violation of labor, civi l
rights, or health and safety laws). Yet, in that event, the law does not need to establish a
fiduciary duty to the corporation's employees in order for the directors to have a duty to
prevent th~ conduct. E.g., Miller v. A.T.&T., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). Suppose,
however, an employee sues the officer or manager who made the decision prejudicing the
employee. Jt is not entirely dear whether the business judgment rule applies to actions of
corporate officers. Comptlrf! Platt v. Richardson, (1989-1990 Transfer Binder] f ed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 194,786 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 1989), wit/1 Massaro v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp.
1068 (D. Mass. 1983). There is little, if any, authority applying the rule to middle managers.
GEVURTZ, supra note 21, at § 4.1.3e. One reason for the lack of authority clarifying the
application of the business judgment rule below the directors' level is the lack of financial
incentive to bring an action against officers or middle managers - which, one s uspects,
would be the reality facing employees as well as shareholders.
" E.g., Franklin A. Gevu rtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Mroniuglt!Ss Vcrbin.~c or
Misgu1ded Notion, 67 5. CAUF. L. REV. 287 (1994).
" E.g., Smith v . Van Gorkom. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
:-: E.g., Auerbach v . Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, (1979). Src nlso AMERICAN L AW INSTITUTE,
PRlNCIPLE..<; OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 401(c). Professor Greenfield attaches great
significance to the requirement of careful process imposed by cases s uch as Van Gorkom.
Vn11 Gorkom is a rare case, however, in imposing liability upon directors for insufficient care
in gathering information before making a decision. Indeed, one suspects that the
magnitude of the decision facing the board in Van Gorkom- setling out the entire company
for $55 per share - had something to do with the court's wi Uingness to demand that the
directors base their decision on more than a 20 minute oral presentation during a 2 hour
meeting at which there was no valuation estimate of the company's stock and no one had
bothered even to read the contract. This is a far cry from providing authority for the
proposition that adoption of a fiduciary duty toward corpnrate employees would lead
courts to require that corporate directors and management adopt m ore process than
corpo rations curren tly follow in making decisions regarding corporate employees.
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conceived the decision, so long as the directors thought their action was
somehow in the best interest of the corporation.33 Regardless of the
precise approach courts follow, the bottom line is that remarkably few
courts have found directors liable for breaching their duty of care in
34
making a business decision. As a result, the duty of care has provided
the shareholders and the corporate entity little protection from the
directors making decisions that are harmful to the interests of the
shareholders or the corporate entity. Accordingly, it is difficult to see
how making employees also the recipients of a duty of care, when
enforcement of the duty is limited by the business judgment rule, is
significantly going to improve decisions from the standpoint of the
employees.
Indeed, the limited protection which the duty of care will create for
employees is simply the flip side of the point made earlier as to how
courts have taken the spine out of the shareholder primacy norm.
Specifically, we saw earlier that courts have been highly deferential to
directors when faced with complaints from shareholders that directors
were sacrificing shareholder interests to advance the interests of
employees, the community, or the like. Conversely, if directors had a
fiduciary duty toward employees, the business judgment rule
presumably would lead a court similarly to short-shrift any argument by
an employee that the directors were sacrificing employee interests to
advance the interests of the shareholders. This is particularly true
insofar as directors would not even need to argue that they somehow
advanced the employees' long-range interests by advancing the interests
of the shareholders. After all, creating a fiduciary duty toward
employees does not eliminate a duty of the directors toward the
shareholders.
B. Why not the Fairness Test for Decisions Involving Corporate Employees?

Perhaps one might attempt to avoid application of the business
judgment rule to decisions regarding corporate employees by conjuring
up some sort of conflict on the part of the directors. Maybe some or all of
the directors own stock in the corporation or receive compensation tied

" See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Compan y, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 {1976) {upholding
an action of board of American Express, which cost company $8 million in tax savings, and
whose rationale was somehow to hide from s tock market fact that directors had lost $24
million in bad investment).
" The Van Gorkom decision discussed earlier received much notoriety because it was
an exception to the typical result.
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to corporate profitability. Needless to say, the stockholders elect the
directors, and, as pointed out earlier, the threat of takeovers can make
directors concerned about maximizing profits for the shareholders.
Accordingly, an employee might argue that the d irectors are not
disin ter estP.d in setting wages or taking othPr actions that might increase

corporate profitability at the employees' expense. By and large, courts
have disregarded analogous conflict of interest arguments when made
35
by shareholders.
The reticence of courts to recognize more subtle conflicts of interest in
claims brought by shareholders against corporate directors does not
reflect a failure of judicial imagination. On the contrary, it sterns from a
practical problem with broadening the scope of situations in which the
fairness test would apply. The fairness test entails a high degree of
judicial scrutiny of the directors' action, with doubts resolved agains t the
directors.JI> This sort of judicial interference with internal corporate
decisions entailing, as it does, exp ensive litigation and the
introduction of significant uncertainty a s to the validity of board
decisions - is acceptable when the decisions triggering fairness review
are the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, directors can minimize
the need to cope with fairness review by abstaining from entering into
7
transactions with their corporation/ or by seeking disinterested
approval of those conflict of interest transactions the directors enter
38
into.
Taking an expansive view of what constitutes a conflict of

"' See. e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (holding that directors were
disinterested in approving compensation for 47% shareholder and in deciding whether to
bring lawsuit based upon this action, despite allegation that 47% shareholder had picked
each d irector to be on board); Kamiu, 3!i3 N.Y.S.2d !i07 (1976) (rejecting argument that
because some directors' bonuses were tied to r eported earnings, directors wer e in conflict
of interest in seeking to increase corpor ation's reported earnings). A different situation is
presented when there is a controlling shareh older w ho dominates the board. In this event,
a transaction in which this shareholder obtains someth ing from the corporation to th e
exclusion of the other shareholders presents a conflict of in terest calling for fairness review.
E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
' ' See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980); Charles Yablon, On the
Allocation nf Burde11s of Proof ill Corporate Law: An Essny
CARDOZO L. REV.

Oil

Fairness nnd Fuzzy Sets, 13

497 {1991 ).
" In this regard, it is worth noting that at one point during the evolution of corporate
law, conflict of interest transactions were automatically voidable if any shareholder
objected. E.g., Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Dirt>ctors Trusters? Conflict of l11terest and Corporate
Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966}.
"' Approval by disinterested directors or shareholders lowers the level of judicial
scrutiny. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987). Authorities are divided as
to w hat precisely this lower level of scrutiny entails. See. e.g.. GEVURrz, supra note 21, at§§
-!.2.3c, -!.2.4a .

2002]

Getting Real About Corporate Social Responsibility

659

interest, however, both increases the number of transactions that the
court would deem to involve a conflict and decreases the possibility of
disinterested approval of such transactions. The result ultimately can be
to trigger strict fairness review for practically every decision of the
board, with the consequence that one may as well move the boardroom
into the courthouse. This discussion, in turn, illustrates a practical
reason why courts would not wish to apply the fairness test to corporate
dealings with employees- even if the directors had a fiduciary duty
toward the company's employees. Specifically, application of the
fairness test to every corporate decision involving employee wages,
terminations, working conditions or anything else impacting employees
could potentially envelop the corporation and the courts in intensive
litigation of virtually every corporate action.
Not only would general application of the fairness test to corporate
actions concerning employees be impractical, it also flies in the face of
the essential nature and purpose of the fairness test. The fairness test is
an exacting standard of judicial review, the purpose of which is to
substitute for the lack of arms-length bargaining that results when those
in control of the corporation have the corporation enter into a transaction
39
with themselves. This exacting scrutiny is based upon the recognition
that when those in control of the company have the company enter into a
transaction with themselves, there is no two-sided bargaining to protect
the company. The fairness test provides a surrogate for this bargaining
by empowering a disinterested party (the court) to ensure that the terms
of a transaction between the corporation and those in control of the
corporation match the arms-length deal the corporation would have
4
made if doing business with one not in control of the company. c• Given
this basic rationale, it makes no sense to apply the fairness test to a
transaction between the corporation and its non-controlling employees.
By definition, this is an arms-length transaction and therefore is fair.~
By contrast, the sort of workplace fairness norms Professor Greenfield
seeks to promote have nothing to do with the fairness test under
corporate law. It is entirely plausible that employees will be happier and
1

~· E.g., GEVGRTZ, supra note 21, at §§ 4.2.1, 4.2.2.
'" See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976}. Accordingly, process and

disclosure are typically less important in the fairness test than is convincing the court of the
substantive merits of the transaction. E.g., GEVU RTZ, supra note 21 , at§ 4.2.2.
" This discussion of fairness is entirely consistent with the use of the test in the sort of
intra-shareholder disputes which arise, for example, in a freeze-out merger. See. e.g.,
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Once again, the test is designt'd to
substitute a strict judicial review for the Jack of arms-length bargaining in such a
transaction.
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more productive in a workplace with established procedures for
employees to air grievances, some sort of due process prior to dismissal,
evenhanded evaluations, promotions and raises, and other efforts to
minimize the pernicio us influence of office politics. This is why unions
often negotiate for such terms; and even without labor contracts,
companies commonly adopt formal personnel policies and procedures.
All this, however, is very different from a judicial test directed at
policing self-dealing.
lil. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES ON
CORPORATE BoARDS

The proposal that corporate boards include employee representatives
involves a different type of corporate governance reform than the
proposals to relax the shareholder primacy norm and to expand the
beneficiaries of the directors' and management's fiduciary duty. Here,
we are dealing with structural change, rather than altering liability rules.
Accordingly, in this instance, we need not consider how courts enforce
42
(or do not enforce) broad corporate law rules of conduct. Nevertheless,
there is real world experience upon which to at least begin an assessment
of the practical impact of employee representatives on corporate boards.
This is because employee representation on corporate boards is an
4
existing phenomenon in a number of nations, most notably Germany. '
A critical determinant of the practical impact of employee
representatives on corporate boards is the role of the board itself. As
noted above, most decisions impacting corporate employees, certainly on
a direct individual level, are made by corporate officers and middle
managers. Hence, employee representatives on corporate boards may
not be in a position to do much good for the corporation's employees
44
unless the board takes an extraordinarily active role. Unfortunately, the
experience in Germany in this regard has not been promising.
According to a recent article by Professor Mark Roe, the requirement of
labor representation on the board of German corporations (so-called codetermination) has had the effect of decreasing the role of the board in

" This is not to say that requiring employee representation on corporate boards might
not create implementation questions.
" E.g., Roe, supra note 17, at 567-68 (observing that German corporations must have
half of their board members fwrn labor). It is also worth m1ting that, from time to time,
there have b~n union representatives on the boards ot certain American corporations.
" Which presumably is why unions are more interested in negotiating for union
representation o n the shop floor than in the boardroom.
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corporate governance. German corporate boards meet infrequently and
their information has been weak.
Professor Roe attributes this
weakening of the German corporate board to the desire of managers and
large shareholders not to enhance the power of labor. This, in turn,
illustrates a common problem with structural reform. Often, the reform
leads to a new equilibrium in which both the goals of the reform have
been frustrated and other undesirable impacts have occurred.
IV. WHY REFORM OF EMPLOYMENT LAW MIGHT PROVIDE A MORE
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ADVANCING THE INTERESTS OF CORPORATE
EMPLOYE ES

In suggesting that a better approach to corporate social responsibility
in general, and employee wages and working conditions in particular,
may lie in laws other than those dealing with corporate governance, one
need not argue that corporate governance should be strictly a matter of
private contract. Instead, one can point to simple practical concerns. For
example, increasing employee bargaining power or raising the minimum
wage could have more impact on employee wages than altering
corporate governance rules.
Need less to say, there is not time in this reply to canvas all of labor
and employment law to compare the effectiveness of reforms in these
areas with the effectiveness of changes in corpora te governance, as a
means to improve wages and working conditions. Instead, it is sufficient
to illustrate the point with one example. This is to compare the efficacy
of liberalizing judicial interpretations of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that exists as part of the employment contract
between an employee and the corporation with extending the fiduciary
duty of directors and management to include an obligation toward
employees. To make this comparison, it is useful to return to the point
made at the outset of the discussion on extending fiduciary duty. As
stated there, such an action requires one to consider who should be liable
to whom, through what procedure, with what remedy, and based upon
what standard. An action against directors, officers, and middle
managers for breach of a fiduciary duty they would owe to employees
would give very different, and potentially worse, answers to these
questions than would an action for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that is part of the employment contract
between an employee and the corporation.

"

R~ .

strprn note 17, at 568.
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To begin with, the defendants in an action for breach of fiduciary duty
would be the parties who breached the duty; in other< words, the
individual directors, officers or middle managers involved. 46 By
contrast, the defendant in an action for breach of an implied covenant of
47
good faith and fair dealing would be the corporate employer. One
suspects that attorneys for plaintiff employees would much rather sue
the corporation than sue the individual directors or executives, at least in
the widely held corporation. The corporation is likely to have deeper
pockets to pay any judgment and will likely evoke less sympathy from a
judge or jury than would an individual corporate official.
Of course, plaintiffs' tactical concerns do not answer why, from a
policy standpoint, the corporation would be the better defendant in a
suit brought by employees. In fact, there are several policy reasons why
liability would be better placed on the corporation than on individual
corporate officials. To begin with, by invoking the shareholder primacy
norm as a source of the problem, Professor Greenfield appears to be
concerned with actions toward employees undertaken to increase profits
for the shareholders (as opposed, for example, based upon bigotry or
lust for power). To the extent that the goal of the directors' or
management's action was to achieve profits for the corporation and its
shareholders, it seems just that the corporation or its shareholders pay
any damages if the directors' or management's actions turn out to be
wrongful. Indeed, given the prevalence of indemnity and insurance
48
provisions covering corporate directors and officers, one suspects the
corporation will pay damages in the end anyway (including through
higher insurance premiums). Allowing the suit to be against the
corporation in the first instance would avoid the need to go through two
proceedings in order for the corporation to end up paying.
Deterrence provides a possible countervailing consideration. If
corporate directors and officials do not personally pay for mistreatment
of employees will they be deterred from such conduct? Presumably, if
the goal of the directors' or officials' actions was to increase corporate
profits, then the prospect of corporate liability for damages should
provide deterrence. If the directors or officials had some other personal
motive, than they would seem to have breached their duty to the
49
corporation and could be liable to indemnify the company. Certainly

" See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
48
See GEVURTZ, supra note 21, at§ 4.4.
49
See, e.g., Stern v. General Electric Co., 924 F.2d 472, 478 n.8 (2d Cir. 1991) (equating
47
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this would be true if the officials' conduct was illegal (as, for instance,
constituting racial or sexual discrimination); in which event, the officials
would face personal liability without the need to recognize a fiduciary
50
duty toward employees.
Also, differences in the standard for imposing liability suggest that the
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a better way to
deal with disputes between the corporation and employees. As
explained above, the corporate law fairness test would not be the
appropriate test to apply to disinterested decisions impacting employees.
Instead, such decisions , would invite application of the business
judgment rule. In fact, courts would be tempted to water down their
review of the decision under the business judgment rule even more than
51
they have in suits brought by shareholders.
The reason is simple.
Courts would be concerned that otherwise directors could be
whipsawed every time they make a decision - if stingy to employees,
52
employees will sue; if generous to employees, shareholders will sue. By
contrast, the contract law concept 'Ofan implied obligation of good faith
and fair dealing, at least if liberally applied, appears much more attuned
to the real issues in the employment context. Professor Greenfield is on
the right tract in stating that employment involves a long-term relational
contract in which the express terms inevitably are incomplete. Yet, there
is an asymmetry in these gaps for employer and employee (or, more
broadly, for principal and agent). The principal is concerned that the
agent exercise reasonable care in carrying out his or her responsibilities
and not use his or her power over the principal's property or affairs in a
way to advance the agent's own interests at the expense of the
principal's. Hence, courts apply the principles of negligence or the
business judgment rule to see that corporate directors and managers
have exercised at least a modicum of care in running the enterprise and
apply the fairness test to ensure that corporate contracts with directors
and managers match the terms of an arms-length transaction. By

bad faith which would breach duty of care under business judgment rule with having
improper purpose).
See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 21 at§ 4.1.6.
51
If such further d~lution is even possible.
52
Cf. American Bar Association, supra note 6, at 2270 (citing fear of such conflicting
suits as reason not to adopt "other constituency" statutes). 1hls discussion has focused on
the conflict between claims by employees and claims by shareholders. In fact, there can be
other conflicts as well. Actions favoring some employees can disfavor others (as in
promotion decisions). Extension of the directors' and officers' fiduciary duty to benefit
other stakeholders, such as creditors, customers, or the community, can multiply these
potential conflicts exponentially.
5()
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contrast, the agent is more concerned with actions by the principal that
exploit gaps in the contract in order to deprive the agent of the expected
compensation for his or her performance . This might involve the
treatment of individual employees (such as laying someone off right
before a pension plan vests) or the treatment of groups of employees
(such as raiding a pension plan to fund a leveraged buy-out). In either
event, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, properly
construed, unlike the corporate law duties of care and loyalty, is
designed to address such conduct.53
CONCLUSION

As stated at a number of points throughout this reply, Professor
Greenfield's paper is simply the latest volley in long-standing debates
about relaxing the shareholder primacy norm, expanding the fiduciary
duty of directors and officers to encompass an obligation to other
stakeholders in the corporation, and including employee representatives
on corporate boards. What Professor Greenfield's paper seeks to add to
these debates is an attempt, through the use of behavioral studies, to
show a potentially positive impact of such p roposals. No doubt this is a
worthwhile addition to scholarship, which, at least as of late, often has
focused too much on economic models. In this reply, I too have sought
to expand the factors taken into account in scholarship regardi ng these
issues. My concern is that much of the literature on these issues,
including Professor Greenfield's paper, fails to consider the limited
practical impact of these various corporate law rules, particularly in light
- - - - -- -

-

- - · -- -

" Sec, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'! Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (dismissal
of salesman in order to avoid paying commissions h eld to violate con-nant of good faith
and fair dealing). But see Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc. 535 N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989)
(holding that a t-will employment doctrine precluded claims by shareholder/employee
who alleged that defendant terminated his employment in order to trigger unf.lVorable
obligation to sell his stock). In fact, if there is an appropriate corporate law test, it might be
the reasonable expectations test applied in some involuntary dissolution cases. S<.'t', e.g.,
Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984) ( holding that two minority
shareholders were entitled to involuntary dissolution of corporation under New York's
statute empowering court to grant dissolution for "oppression," when majo rity acteJ in
way to defeat m inority's reasonable expectation that all shareholders would benefit from
their ownership through receipt of bonuses which constituted de facto dividends). Withnut
belaboring the point, there can be other differt'nces between the fiduciary duty and the
good faith and fair dealing actions. For instance, a suit for breach of the implied coven,mt
of good faith and fair dealing avoids the need to untangle the question of whether the
appropriate action is a direct suit, or a derivative suit on behalf of the corporate entity - an
issue which adds to the complexity of sh<:uehl>lder action;; agains t directors for breach of
fiduciary duty.
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